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A stronger role for the European Parliament in the design of the EU’s investment policy 








Since the Treaty of Lisbon and the transfer of exclusive competence over FDI from the 
member states to the EU, the European Commission has designed an innovative investment 
policy, leaving in the shadows another powerful actor whose contribution can easily be 
overlooked. Yet, in the post-Lisbon era, the European Parliament not only enjoys extensive 
powers in the formulation of the EU’s investment policy, but it has also made clear that it will 
not hesitate to use them. Its involvement is a significant and welcome development, given that 
the Parliament is the EU’s democratically elected institution, and an active role should be 
envisaged going forward. 
 
In the post-Lisbon era, the Parliament and Council act through regulations to define the 
framework for the EU’s investment policy. The Parliament may require that its 
recommendations to the Council or the Commission be taken into account. It has further 
acquired the right to be immediately and fully informed about investment negotiations.
   
The Commission’s negotiators regularly brief the monitoring groups of the Parliament’s 
Committee on International Trade, and technical debriefings are held with members of the 
Parliament. This ensures that the two institutions are on the same page, and that the 
Commission can be mindful of the Parliament’s wishes. 
 
For good reason, the Commission is mindful of the Parliament’s wishes. Since the Treaty of 
Lisbon, the conclusion of international investment agreements (IIAs) requires parliamentary 
consent, effectively investing the Parliament with a veto power over investment negotiations. 
Cognizant of the sway of its new power, the Parliament has voted down two international 
agreements,
1
 demonstrating to those who had any doubt that its consent is not a mere 
formality to be taken for granted, but a means for it to exert leverage over negotiations. The 
“threat” that its consent may be declined ensures respect for its views.  
 
A combined reading of Parliament resolutions and EU IIAs reveals this interplay of power 
between Parliament and Commission. An example comes from investor-state dispute 
settlement (ISDS). The Parliament’s Resolution of April 6, 2011 stressed the need to reform 
the existing ISDS machinery to increase transparency and allow appeals.
2
 The Resolution of 
October 9, 2013 took the view that non-litigious dispute settlement should be provided.
3
 The 
Resolution of July 8, 2015 urged the Commission to replace arbitration with a system with 
2 
 
publicly-appointed judges and an appellate mechanism.
4
 Subsequently, the Commission 
presented the two-tiered investment court system, increased transparency and added soft 
mechanisms.  
 
Of course, to say that the Parliament has a meaningful role is not to say that it has the only 
role in shaping investment negotiations; for example, the Resolution of July 8, 2015 followed 
the Commission’s own concept paper,5 which had already envisioned an investment court, 
transparent ISDS and an appellate mechanism. The concept paper itself was presented at a 
time when pressure was brought to bear on the Commission by member states, especially 
Germany, in relation to reform of ISDS and an investment court system. In reality, at the EU 
level, the Parliament expresses concerns and identifies risks; its inputs are broadly-worded 
policy suggestions. The Commission proposes ways to address these risks and has the 
technical expertise to elaborate concrete investment provisions. The EU’s investment policy 
appears then as the culmination of an institutional dialogue.  
 
That the Parliament’s imprimatur attaches to the new IIAs is appropriate and should be 
encouraged. Investment negotiations have moved center stage in the public debate, and it is 
hoped that the Parliament’s interest will not wane when the public debate subsides. As the 
Parliament continues to exercise its formal right to be informed, the specialized knowledge it 
gains will allow it to formulate more concise and informed policy suggestions.  
 
Going forward, it may also be opportune to move away from the current all-or-nothing 
consent model to allow the EU’s political institution formally to propose amendments during 
negotiations. Either way, the Treaty of Lisbon has given the Parliament the necessary powers 
to impact the content of EU IIAs and reduce the need, if any, for member state participation in 
the design of the EU’s investment policy. In the new state of affairs, the Parliament is a player 
to be reckoned with; at the same time, it needs to learn how to handle its new role. This larger 
public role of the Parliament is desirable. The greater its involvement, as a democratically 
elected institution, the stronger its legitimizing effect on investment negotiations, further 
rationalizing the competence transfer over FDI from the member states to the EU.  
 
An active, constructive and publicized participation of the Parliament may be key to 
convincing stakeholders that the design of the EU’s investment policy is both legitimate and 
representative. 
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In 2010, the Parliament declined its consent to the first version of the EU-US SWIFT-Terrorist Finance 
Tracking Program Agreement, and, in 2012, to the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement. 
2
 Resolution of April 6, 2011 on the future European international investment policy, para. 31. 
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 Resolution of October 9, 2013 on the EU-China negotiations for a bilateral investment agreement, paras. 45-46. 
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